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Public aid in the banking
system: rescuing ones to
the detriment of others?*
Ten of the most powerful EU economies have approved public aid
schemes involving the use of public capital in banks that are
solvent at first glance. Until March 2009, Spain had not submitted
any such scheme, which has caused complaints by some banks due
to the disadvantage this meant to them. However, such complaints
are not shared by all. There are some who believe that the market
will be able to make out the difference between banks with public
capital and those without. Others think that the European
Commission has included necessary protection to do away with any
possible advantage. The present article intends to determine what
is true about this variety of opinions and discusses the possible
reasons that could justify awarding public aid to solvent banks, the
distortion this creates in the markets and proposed solutions to
minimise it. What we are concerned about is the impact hardly
coordinated action of member states regarding solvent banks may
have on pan-European bank competition.
SANDRA JÓDAR-ROSELL 
JORDI GUAL
* We would like to thank our colleagues from the Area of Economic Studies and Analysis of
“La Caixa” for the debate: Oriol Aspachs, Matthias Bulach, Enric Fernández, Avelino Hernán-
dez and Anna Mialet.
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State aid and the role of the
European Commission
In order to have a reference of the position of
the European Commission related to aid to
the banking sector, it is worth having a short
overview over its current policy regarding state
aid. The use of public resources to support
certain companies is usually to the detriment
of a country’s welfare. This is so as it allows
survival of companies less efficient than their
competitors and thus spending resources that
could be devoted to more productive activity.
In certain cases, however, pubic intervention
can be justified on grounds of equity or to cor-
rect market failures. Hence the European body
in charge of looking after competition also has
the task of supervising state aid, defined as
transfer of state resources creating an eco-
nomic advantage for the receiving company
with respect to its market competitors, which
it would not have obtained in the normal
course of its business.
Generally speaking, article 87(1) of the European
Union treaty states that state aid is incompatible
with the single market if it can have an effect
on competition and trade between member
states. Whenever this risk exists, the European
Commission has to examine if there is any
 reason of efficiency and/or equity compensating
the negative effects on competition. The same
article 87, in its section 3, establishes a set of
possible reasons justifying the award of state
aid.1 These reasons have been later developed
by the Commission through a set of regulations
in order to provide states with a certain legal
safety and enhance the process to review aid
plans.
Generally speaking, the Commission distin-
guishes between two big types of state aid. A
first group is made of state aid schemes aimed
at mitigating market failures that may occur in
any industry. These schemes have a clear effi-
ciency goal and do not discriminate between
companies or sectors that may benefit from aid,
so they hardly bear any protectionist motivation
for that state. Hence the Commission has a
positive attitude towards such aid, declaring it
compatible with the treaty. This group also
encompasses aid to small and medium-sized
enterprises as well as aid for R&D&I, environ-
mental protection, employment and training
and aid for venture capital. The one given to
companies in worse-off regions (related to
either the EU or the national average) also
tends to be authorised on social or equity
grounds. 
The Union treaty states that state
aid is incompatible with the single
market if it can have an effect on
competition.
A second group is made of aid defined by the
Commission as sectorial. In this case, it is aid to
companies operating in sectors subject to specific
EU regulation (agriculture, fishery and transport),
in declining sectors or in sectors having been
recently submitted to regulation, thus increasing
competition.2 This category also includes aid to
rescue and restructure companies in crisis.
Apart from those sectors under specific regula-
tion, the beneficiaries of sectorial aid are
 companies with efficiency problems challenging
their survival.
Giving state aid to a particular branch is basically
justified on grounds of social or regional policy, to
facilitate sectorial restructuring processes and
to compensate the damaged party for adjust-
ment. For this reason, the concession includes
restrictions on the use of the aid – for instance,
in the case of declining branches, the aid can-
not be used to increase the production capacity
within the same branch – and is usually tempo-
rary. In the case of aid to companies in crisis –
those that cannot ensure their own survival in the
short and medium term – such restrictions are
even more severe. First, given that it is awarded
because it is believed that the company can be
feasible in the long term, it requires a detailed
restructuring plan that will be supervised
 occasionally. And second, it can only be given
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once to avoid that the company only survives
thanks to state aid. The intensity of aid is
restricted to the indispensable minimum to
cover restructuring costs and needs to come
with the maximum possible contribution by aid
beneficiaries in the form of own resources.
This contribution needs to be significant, so it
is a clear signal that the owners believe in their
company’s survival. Finally, conditions are
imposed to minimise negative effects on
 competition. For instance, assets may need
to be sold or the production capacity of the
company reduced.
The bank aid avalanche and
the reaction of the European
Commission
Within the financial crisis started in summer 2007
and a context of increasing weakness of many
international banking systems, the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 was a
 climax of uncertainty that triggered big mistrust in
capital markets while causing panic among
investors and virtually closing down short-term
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(*) Estimate of the amount endorsed so far by the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program TLGP.
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/16/news/economy/fdic_tlgp/
(**) Includes 75 billion euros for a Clearingbank with state guarantee and another 15 billion in other guarantees
for bank debt and assets.
Chart 1. Amount of aid to the banking sector since January 2008 (million euros)
Source: European Commission, ministries of finance and Bloomberg as well as own
Governments have intervened to prevent collapse of their financial systems.
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financing markets. Given the inability of successive
liquidity injections and interest rate cuts by cen-
tral banks to restore the situation, governments
of developed countries decided to intervene to
prevent collapse of their financial systems. The
aim was to avert massive withdrawal of citizens’
deposits in banks, avoid liquidity troubles affecting
the solvency of the system and prevent the
 financial crisis from spilling over to the real econ-
omy. Thus the banking sector added to the list of
branches on public aid.
In the beginning, interventions were in
the shape of capital injections into
banks with massive solvency
problems.
Devoting public funds to aid the international
finance industry has taken different shapes and is
still evolving as contagion of the real economy
grows. In the beginning, interventions were in
the shape of capital injections into banks with
massive solvency problems. The aim was to
 comply with the first commitment taken by the
G-7 countries at their October meeting: to avoid,
by using all possible means, default of any major
bank from a systemic perspective. The second
step was to enlarge the amounts subject to bank
deposit guarantee, and then extend it to other
short-term debt. Public support to bank liabilities
continued with «preventive» capital injections
into solvent banks, and now the possibility is
planned to offer insurance schemes against loss
from potentially toxic assets still remaining on the
balance sheet of banks.3
Not only have instruments used been manifold,
but also the reaction of the states has been het-
erogeneous. In the case of the European Union,
with twenty-seven states required to give notice
of any state aid scheme, the challenge for the
Commission of ensuring that none of these
schemes distorts the functioning of the European
single market is enormous, especially when
events are developing at great speed and
 member states react almost simultaneously. The
Commission therefore decided to set a general
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framework,4 the Banking Communication,
according to which the scheme of each country
will be negotiated. This framework states the
position of the Commission towards this aid,
while specifying the instruments it considers
appropriate to face the financial crisis, the
 criteria to follow to ensure proportionality of
aid, potential competition problems that may
come up and indispensable action to be taken
in order to minimise them.
When analysing the different instruments to
assist the banking sector that are being imple-
mented, it is very important to acknowledge
that the present financial crisis involves in fact
two different problems, although they are basi-
cally linked to each other. The first is strong
depreciation of the value of assets the risk
of which was considerably undervalued. The
magnitude of this depreciation is big enough to
create solvency problems in banks owning
them, so it is possible that there are banks
unable to keep their commitment and will need
to be liquidated or restructured. The second
problem is uncertainty prevailing in financial
markets, which makes it almost impossible to
renew short-term financing of banks. If this
 liquidity problem is not solved in time, banks
can be forced to sell assets, which would push
down their value and create solvency problems
where there were perhaps none.
The position of the European Commission
regarding state aid to the banking sector is
to distinguish between solvency and liquidity
problems. Aid aimed at solving solvency problems
– such as the emergency rescue of Northern
Rock, Hypo Real Estate, Fortis Bank or Dexia –
are analysed according to rescue and restruc-
turing aid regulations. As has been mentioned
above, such regulation is stricter and requires
clear and feasible bank restructuring plans. Aid
aimed at solving liquidity distress is analysed
under the new framework defined by the Banking
Communication. Thus, one requirement to
receive state aid by this criterion is to demon-
strate that the bank is solvent. The definition of
a solvent bank is however in the hands of the
supervisor of each member state.
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Finally, the Commission has adopted a more
permissive position with this kind of aid
than what would be normal under different
 circumstances. It has granted the legal base to
exceptionally apply article 87(3)b of the treaty.
According to this article, aid «to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a Member State»
can be considered compatible with the single
market. Thus the financial crisis is considered
a mitigating circumstance in this case. This has
several important implications. The first is that
aid declared compatible will be so as long as
the present financial crisis, the source of serious
disturbance lasts. Thus the Commission has
established a review every six months and aid
will be extended according to its result. The
 second implication is that aid plans will be
declared compatible if they are well pointed
towards solving the present financial crisis. 
So far, the Commission has established that
state sureties on debt issues of banks and
 preventive recapitalisation with public funds are
two instruments well pointed towards solving
disturbance in the financial markets.5
The surety schemes
Uncertainty causing the lack of short-term
bank financing has its origin in a problem of
asymmetric information and creates big negative
externalities on the real economy. Indeed, every
bank has better information than the rest as to
the risk it has incurred and the loss it may
 suffer. In normal times, such asymmetry
between information available to the bank and
to the market is minimised thanks to the role of
given stakeholders like rating agencies investing
in gathering information and issuing certificates.
Nevertheless, the present crisis has revealed
inaccuracy in certification given by these agencies,
so the consequences of asymmetric information
are heavily noticed. The liquidity crisis in inter-
banking and debt markets is the most relevant
of these consequences and the one extending
the problems of the finance sector to the real
economy.
The state surety is an instrument
aimed at minimising the problem of
adverse selection. The purchaser of
endorsed debt only considers the risk
of non-payment by the state.
When a bank comes back to the market to raise
resources in the form of debt, the holders of such
resources do not have enough information to
 distinguish between solvent banks needing
 liquidity from insolvent ones in the short or
medium term. Asking a higher price for them
does not solve the problem as a too high price
can deter solvent banks and attract only those
having more serious problems. This phenomenon
is known as adverse selection and is a market
failure due to the lack of transactions in the
short-term financing market. The existence of
such failure, which the market is unable to correct
under the current situation and whose effects
extend to the rest of economic areas, justifies
state intervention to solve liquidity distress.
The state surety is clearly an instrument aimed at
minimising the problem of adverse selection.
With this instrument, the state commits to reim-
burse the debt holder in case the bank is unable
to fulfil its duties. As the state is ultimately
responsible for payment, the potential purchaser
of endorsed debt only considers the risk of non-
payment by the state. This risk is not subject to
information problems, a fact proven by high
demand of sovereign debt. So banks can obtain
liquidity from the market through endorsed debt
issues. As the state has better information on the
probability of non-payment of these banks thanks
to its banking supervising body, it could theoreti -
cally appraise the risk it takes on and set a price
for the surety.
When establishing compatibility with the com-
mon surety scheme market, the Commission
assesses the proportionality of that measure
and possible distortion of competition. Propor-
tionality is determined to a large extent by the
kind of debt endorsed. If the aim is to solve the
problem of asymmetric information to which
new debt issues of banks are subject, it seems
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reasonable to think that the surety should be
restricted to new debt issues in the medium
term. However, this has not always been the
case. The Commission has approved schemes
guaranteeing old debt or covering the issue of
subordinate debt, which accounts as capital for
regulatory purposes.6
Discrimination between banks needs
to be avoided as well as creating a
vantage position for beneficiary
against non-beneficiary banks.
Regarding possible distortion in competition,
discrimination between banks in giving aid
needs to be avoided as well as creating a vantage
position for beneficiary against non-beneficiary
banks in those markets they share. In this
respect, it is paramount to set the right price at
which sureties are given. On the one hand,
price fixing conditions need to be objective to
avoid discrimination between banks; on the
other, the price has to reflect the real risk of
that bank without including any hidden subsidy
that may benefit banks of a member state in
relation with the rest.
In most plans, the Commission has tried to
harmonise all these goals by guiding the
amount of the surety according to the risk of
the bank as perceived by the market prior to
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.7 This risk is
measured by the average quotation of credit
default swaps (CDS) between January 2007 and
August 2008, increased by 50 basis points. This
way, there is neither full trust in current risk
perception by the market nor is it up to every
state to decide on the price to be set.8 On the
contrary, the Commission decided to keep
the position related to bank risk as perceived
by the market before the crisis became acute
and to reflect worse conditions through a fixed
portion of the price.
Leaving the scheme open to all banks9 at a price
that follows objective and quite homogeneous
criteria across all member states minimises the
risk of distortion between beneficiary and
non-beneficiary banks. The only problem is
posed by those countries standing surety by
inappropriate standards. Nevertheless, the
Commission has in these cases imposed
restrictions on the action of these beneficiary
banks to avoid use of this advantage to
expand their business. These restrictions,
which will be discussed more in detail in
 relation with recapitalisation, can include
 limits on balance growth, publicity of surety,
remuneration of managers or maintenance of
solvency ratios.
Schemes of preventive
recapitalisation
Adequacy of recapitalisation with public funds
is much more controversial than that with
sureties, as it is a measure that can be applied
to solve both circumstantial problems out of
financing needs and more serious problems of
solvency. A first point of conflict is that this
instrument may be used to help banks in
great difficulties, thus avoiding the harsher
restrictions of rescue aid.
As there is already an instrument – sureties –
specifically aimed at counteracting liquidity
distress in the debt market, the question is
what can lead solvent banks to need financing
through capital increase. A possible answer
is the need of banks to have a capital cushion
above that needed to cover solvency ratios
required by the Basel Agreement. Indeed,
when non-compliance with capital requirements
leads to penalty for banks and the capital
market suffers from any imperfection – e.g.
the above-mentioned problem with asymmet-
ric information – the best banks can do is to
have a cushion that allows them to absorb
possible future loss without any risk of non-
compliance with capital requirements.10
Within the present context, it is possible that
banks, even those without loss, wish to
increase this cushion as they perceive a rise in
penalties due to improper capitalisation.
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Penalties may come from the supervising body
if it tightens its criteria or from markets, which
can assess bank stock at a lower price or make
its financing with long-term debt more expensive
if there is any suspicion about its capitalisation
level. In any case, given the high cost of capital
increase amidst a crisis, banks have two ways
of increasing their cushion. One is to reduce
the amount of credit given by the bank.
 However, this reduction goes against the goals
of a government intending to do away with
recession. The other possibility is to sell assets.
In this case, there is the risk that a big number
of banks decide to sell at the same time, thus
pushing the price of assets below their base
value, which could create solvency problems
where there were not any.
Hence it is possible that the wish of certain
banks to increase their capital cushion creates
inefficiencies, either because it will cause a
shrinkage in the credit offer that will prevent
feasible projects from being implemented,
or because of the systemic consequences of
massive asset sale. In this respect, preventive
recapitalisation of solvent banks can be justified
to counteract such inefficiencies as it allows
them to reach their optimum capital level without
any need of doing such adjustment.
The wish of banks to increase 
their capital cushion can create
inefficiencies due to a shrinkage in
the credit offer or the consequences of
selling assets.
Nevertheless, preventive recapitalisation can
generate a definitely big distortion in competi-
tion. Starting with conditions in access to aid,
it is very difficult to set an objective level of
capital remuneration the state should require.
Although remuneration should approach the
level a private investor would ask for, it is also
true that the state internalises benefits from
e.g. more available credit for the whole economy
and could thus accept lower remuneration
in exchange for this possibility. The difficulty
in assessing both factors under present
 circumstances has created a certain degree of
heterogeneity in remuneration required by the
different member states so far. In a recent
communication11, the Commission pointed
out that repayment of hybrid capital instru-
ments used by states should be between the
level required by the market for subordinate
debt (ca. 7% average) and that required for
ordinary shares (ca. 9.3% average).12 Such
repayment should be increasing with time to
provide incentives for banks to replace public
capital by private one as soon as possible.
Judging the proportionality of preventive
recapi talisation to solve inefficiencies requires
to determine what capital level every bank
needs in order not to restrict credit to profitable
projects. As opposed to the surety case, in
which the decision on what amount needed to be
issued with surety was basically determined by
the sum due in the medium term, the demand
of public capital by banks is not detached from
how the plan is set up. This will depend on the
price at which the state is ready to inject capital.
As we will see, a too low price can provide
banks with incentives to apply for cheap public
capital above the social optimum. In such a
 situation, the Commission simply points out
that it will be sympathetic towards preventive
recapitalisation increasing the capital ratio by
up to 200 basis points. This margin of available
capital may be too large in the case of banks
still having a relatively high ratio.
However, the main part of competitive dis-
tortion will be caused by the existence of
some advantage for banks with public capital
compared to the rest in every market they
compete in. Having public capital can bear
two advantages that will in their turn have
an influence on competition in different
markets.
On the one side, public capital can reduce
the bank risk as perceived by investors. This
would be an advantage to raise financing in
the long-term debt market. On the other
side, having access to abundant capital under
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better conditions than competitors allows
to pursue aggressive strategies to capture
customers. Distortion in competition will
appear in this case in retail and corporate
banking markets.
Distortion in the long-term debt market
The financial crisis has had serious consequences
on debt markets. On the one hand, it has
aggravated problems of asymmetric information
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«Preferred»
capital
ratio
Instrument
Repayment
asked by the
state
Imposed
limitations
Greece Tier-1: 8-10 % Preferential
shares
10 % • 1 board member
• Limitation on balance growth
• Restructuring plan
• Limitation on manager remuneration
• Prohibition to declare dividend as
long as it benefits from public capital
United
Kingdom*
Tier-1: 8 %
Core T1: 4 %
Preferential
shares
12 % • Limitation on manager remuneration
• For banks with problems:
-  Limitation on balance growth
-  Restructuring plan
Germany* Tier-1: 10 % Preferential
shares
•  Between 7% and 9.3%
in the 1st year for solvent
banks based on
instrument and risk
•  10% min. in the 1st year
for banks with problems
•  Growing with time
• Limitation on balance growth
• Requirements on solvency ratio
• Limitation on manager remuneration
• For banks with problems:
-  Restructuring plan
France* Tier-1: 8,5-9 % Subordinate
debt
•  Based on bank risk
•  8% average
• Obligations on credit growth
• Limitation on manager
remuneration
Italy* Tier-1: 8 % Subordinate
debt
•  7.5% - 8.5% in the 1st
year
•  Growing with time
• On dividend, remuneration and
other restrictions on conduct
Denmark* Tier-1: 12 % Hybrid capital
Tier-1
9-12% based
on bank risk
• Limitation on manager remuneration
• Prohibition to declare dividend until
2010
• Obligations on credit growth
• For banks with problems:
- Restructuring plan
(*) Commission report undisclosed
Chart 2. Recapitalisation schemes approved by the European Commission
Source: European Commission, ministries of finance and Bloomberg as well as own
The Commission will be sympathetic towards preventive recapitalisation increasing the capital ratio by
up to 200 basis points.
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so any sign of risk for a bank has a great impact
on the price of its issues. On the other, massive
loss has constrained demand of bank debt. In
this respect, any sign perceived as a reduction
of risk could mean much smaller financing
costs that those of competitors.
Hence competition in these markets can be
 distorted if the different public capital injections
into banks change their risk perception. There
are different reasons for which this may occur.
First, as beneficiary banks can take advantage of
more capital than others to absorb loss following
public injection, any debt emission the former
does will be perceived as having a lower risk.
Besides, it is possible that public capital injection
points towards a certain degree of public com-
mitment to save that bank regarding any future
contingency. Such commitment would contribute
to reduce even more the risk perceived by the
market. Finally, capital ratios explicitly mentioned
by many states as being «preferential» for their
banks, which are clearly above the requirements
of the Basel Agreement, can be interpreted by
markets as a new de facto regulatory minimum
applicable to all banks.
The immediate consequence is that the capital
cushion of banks not benefiting from aid is
reduced, which pushes them to increase their
capital (under increasingly costly conditions). In
an extreme case, banks with an appropriate
ratio by the Basel Agreement standards but far
from the one preferred by states can be per-
ceived by markets as having solvency problems,
which makes their long-term debt expensive.
Hence it is possible that preventive recapitalisation
done in other countries has placed Spanish
banks in an unfavourable position, altering their
financing cost in debt markets. It is certainly
 difficult to quantify this disadvantage as even
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Annual
coupon
Discount for
new investors
Capital
increase
(million £)
Through
public
capital
Royal Bank
of Scotland 12 % 8.5 % 20,000
Lloyds TSB 12 % 8.5 % 5,500
HBOS 12 % 8.5 % 11,500
Through
private
capital
Barclays 14 % 22.5 % 6,500
Standard
Chartered – 48.7 % 1,779
Preferential
stock
Ordinary
stock
Chart 3. Conditions for preventive recapitalisation of British banks
Source: UK Treasury and banks as well as own
In the United Kingdom, the preventive recapitalisation plan came along with the public surety scheme.
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under normal conditions the risk of a bank is
determined by many parameters – such as
country or market risk where it operates – that
should be controlled to isolate the effect of
public capital entry.
Nevertheless, it is possible to have an indication
about the existence of a change in relative
risk between beneficiary and non-beneficiary
banks by looking at the case of preventive recapi-
talisation in the United Kingdom, given the
nature of action taken and the different reactions
of banks. In the United Kingdom, the preventive
recapitalisation plan came along with the public
surety scheme. The government established as
an eligibility criterion to take part in this scheme
that banks needed to have a Tier-1 capital ration
appropriate in the government’s view. Specifi-
cally, the British supervisor stated that it would
consider a Tier-1 capital ratio at 8% and a core
capital13 one at 4% adequate. Those banks wishing
to benefit from the surety scheme without
 complying with these ratios could apply for the
governmental recapitalisation plan or try to
increase capital on their own.
Among the main national banks, Royal Bank of
Scotland (RBS), Lloyds TSB and HBOS applied
for public recapitalisation, Abbey and HSBC
injected own funds from their mother company,
while Barclays and Standard Chartered went to the
market to increase their capital. A CDS  evolution
analysis of these banks is a first approach to
change in relative risk based on the different
nature (public or private) of recapitalisation.
Graph 1 shows the CDS evolution of banks
that did not receive public capital against a
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Graph 1. Differential between 5-year CDS of non-beneficiary banks and synthesised CDS
of banks with public capital
Source: Datastream and own
The perception related to risk turned upside down just after the announcement by the British
government of public recapitalisation.
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weighted CDS average of those banks that did
receive it (RBS, Lloyds and HBOS). Till the  
no difference in risk between banks was stated.
From that point, differences became apparent,
especially following nationalisation of North-
ern Rock.
It is possible that preventive
recapitalisation done in other
countries has placed Spanish banks in
an unfavourable position
The graph shows how, as the crisis makes
headway, HSBC, Standard Chartered and to a
lesser extent Barclays were perceived as banks
with a lower risk than those receiving later
public capital. Nevertheless, this perception
related to risk turned upside down just after the
announcement by the British government of
public recapitalisation in October 2008, despite
the injection of private funds these three banks
did in those days.
Despite its simplicity, this analysis shows how
the public or private nature of recapitalisation
affects the risk perception of a bank in a dif-
ferent way. Thus Barclays, HSBC and Standard
Chartered  have seen their financing cost
increase in relative terms compared to their
competitors following public recapitalisation.
We believe it can be argued that the effect on
the risk of these three banks is representative
of the effect on the risk of others without public
capital (no matter their country of origin). In
this case, the graph shows how action taken
in one country can place banks of another
member state in a disadvantage and create
negative externalities reflected in higher cost
of access to long-term financing. The conse-
quence for the latter member state will be a
higher cost in banking services and an even
stronger credit crunch. This can lead states to
start off competitive recapitalisation of their
banks in order to prevent such externalities.
This would be the case of recapitalisation of
French banks, which despite enjoying a better
situation and showing no signs of a credit
crunch, accepted an injection of public capital
to reach Tier-1 capital ratios between 8.5%
and 9%, similar to their British counterpart.
Distortion in the retail and corporate
bank markets
Retail banking has two features having a
notable influence on the kind of strategies
used by banks to compete. On the one side,
their relational character has customers incur in
exchange costs when they wish to operate with
a different bank than the usual one – the new
bank has no information on them and thus
faces a problem of adverse selection similar to
the one discussed before. As a consequence, the
customer is rather inclined to go on operating
through the same bank once they have taken a
decision.
On the other hand, banks take advantage of
economies of scale in distributing financial
products, so they obtain cost advantages in a
given product thanks to associated sales. Both
features justify the use of short-term aggressive
strategies to capture customers who are only
profitable in the long term thanks to the capac-
ity of retaining them. Considering that credit is
one of the products most widely used to cap-
ture customers, having public capital provides a
clear competitive advantage.
On the one side, banks having obtained public
capital have the necessary cushion to continue
giving credit and to do so under better condi-
tions, as public capital is available and cheaper
than private one. On the other side, if the state
forces these banks to give credit on grounds of
efficiency, the customers thus seized can be
retained thanks to exchange costs once the
state withdraws its share.
The disadvantage for Spanish banks
shows in the corporate banking
market, where the main competitors
are other European banks.
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In the beginning, these potential anti-competitive
effects on the retail market were acknowledged
by the Commission in its Banking Communica-
tion, urging for restrictions on action of benefi-
ciary companies to authorise both surety and
recapitalisation schemes. It thus imposed a
limit on balance growth of beneficiary banks
aimed at preventing credit growth beyond
what was needed to reactivate the economy –
thus implying that it would be reducing the
market share of banks without public capital.
However, in a new communication on recapi-
talisation, the Commission stepped back and
set an end to the limitations on balance growth
in case of solvent banks. They have been
replaced by applicable and effective national
protection ensuring credit concession to the
real economy.
It seems that the Commission trusts the price
of public capital and credit requirements to
make sure that capital injections are used for
the desired purposes and not to finance aggressive
commercial expansion. However, if the price is
too low, there is the risk of giving incentives to
banks to apply for cheap public capital above
the social optimum.
In fact, despite the possibility of aggressive
expansion in the domestic retail market not
being profitable if all banks have access to
 public capital, it may be interesting to expand
the subsidiaries operating in geographical
 markets where the state has not such a scheme
in place. Another possibility is to compete more
aggressively in larger markets than the
national, as is the case of corporate banking,
understood as the market for traditional financial
brokerage services for large corporations.
From a Spanish perspective, distortion in the
local retail banking market can be relatively
low as there are not many subsidiaries of public
capital beneficiary banks having a significant
presence in the market (except ING). Neverthe-
less, the disadvantage for Spanish banks can
show in the corporate banking market, where
the main competitors are other European
banks.
In this case, the disadvantage with respect to
other banks with public capital is double: the
price at which the latter can offer credit is influ-
enced not only by their cushion of cheap capital
but also by their smaller cost of long-term
financing.
Conclusion
This article has tried to argue that some recent
public intervention to help the banking system
features serious competition problems for
which the European Commission has not
established any counteracting measures. The
main problems are created by preventive recap-
italisation of solvent banks.
This sort of public aid not only creates negative
effects by fostering competitive recapitalisation
and distortion of competition in the different
markets but it also hampers deeper integration
of the European market. This is due to the fact
that access of the state to the shareholder
structure of banks may have replaced access of
private banks from another member state with
the necessary capital.
One should ask if the distortion
created is not undermining the real
benefit of aid or if there is no other
instrument allowing to meet the same
goals.
Despite efficiency arguments justifying public
capital injection into solvent banks, one should
ask if the distortion created is not undermining
the real benefit of aid or if there is no other
instrument allowing to meet the same goals. In
this respect, if the main problem is great uncer-
tainty among banks – regarding both alien and
own risk – it seems reasonable to think that the
best solution is to do away with such uncertainty
as soon as possible. The current recapitalisation
schemes are not good for that. On the contrary,
assurances on toxic assets could be a step in the
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right direction. The problem with such assurances
is that they would require stronger protection as
well as strict and credible supervision in the eyes
of the Commission. The ability of the Commis-
sion of penalising single companies or states
affected by a particular problem is high. Never-
theless, under present circumstances, in which all
member states are affected by the same problem,
the Commission’s real negotiation power seems
much lower. This is shown in the heterogeneity
of action it has accepted, which raises doubts on
its ability to supervise aid schemes with an
increasing impact on the competitive situation of
the branch.
Change of cycle or change of model?154
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Notes
1. Article 87(2) also provides for exceptions to incompatibility of public aid but refers to very specific cases such as aid to repair damage
caused by natural disasters or needed to consolidate German reunification. It also establishes social aid aimed at individual consumers
as being compatible, as far as this does not discriminate consumed products based on their origin.
2. Apart from agriculture, fishery and transport, the beneficiary branches of sectorial aid are audio-visual production, radio broadcast-
ing, coal, power, postal services and shipbuilding.
3. As this article was written, the United Kingdom was the only European country having initiated an insurance scheme against toxic
assets, which was pending approval by the Commission. This is the reason why the article does not consider this sort of instrument.
However, it needs to be said that these assurances can be a better instrument than preventive recapitalisation given the uncertainty of
the value of toxic assets of banks. Nevertheless, in the light of the complexity of such assessment, it will be very difficult to prevent
premiums and other conditions of such assurances from including a significant part of public aid distorting competition.
4. COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2008/C 270/02. «The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis».
5. Apart from surety and recapitalisation, some member states have submitted other additional instruments approved by the Commis-
sion (e.g. the Fund to Acquire Financial Assets in Spain). Given their rather specific character, tailormade to the financial system of
each country, the present article will not deal with these other instruments.
6. In Ireland, the surety scheme covers old subordinate debt, accounted as Tier-2 capital. In the case of Denmark, the scheme covers
non-subordinate senior debt without guarantee already in place for a two-year period. Austria also includes a three-year coverage for
previously existing lenders.
7. The surety price in Denmark, Ireland and France does not follow this rule, but every bank will contribute to a portion of the cost of
the scheme estimated by the state.
8. Nevertheless, the states still have a certain margin to influence the final price of the surety. For instance, the CDS reference period
has been fixed between July 2007 and July 2008 in the UK. Another example is the case of Spain and the Netherlands, where the sure-
ty price calculated according to the former rule is limited by a maximum based on the bank rating. This maximum amount is the aver-
age of CDS quotations of banks with an identical rating (AA or A) during the same period.
9. To avoid discrimination, the communication of the Commission also requires that the concession of surety follows objective, non-
discriminatory eligibility criteria, especially regarding subsidiary banks from other member states.
10. For a model on the optimum capital level of banks considering the Basel Agreement and imperfection of the capital market, cf. VAN
DEN HEUVEL (2007). The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, mimeo.
11. COMMUNICATION FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2009/C 10/03. «The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial
crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition».
12. The Commission is also of the opinion that required remuneration should increase with the risk of the bank, apart from depending
on the type of instrument chosen.
13. According to the definition of «core capital» by the Financial Services Authority (FSA).
A_142-155_Gual_2.qxp:núm.2  23/6/09  13:29  Página 155
